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Sturrup v. Mahan and its Progeny: 
Is There a Constitutional Right to Play 
High School Basketball in Indiana? 
l. INTRODUCTION 
If asked to identify individual rights and freedoms protect-
ed under the United States Constitution or the constitution of a 
particular state, most Americans could name freedom of reli-
gion, freedom of expression, the right to vote, and the prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures. Likewise, most 
educators are familiar with the major cases in which the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has measured the policies, rules and 
procedures of the public schools against the basic guarantees 
found in the Bill of Rights. For example, in Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court established that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law 
forbids racial segregation in public schools. 1 In Goss v. Lopez, 
the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
certain procedural safeguards within public school discipline 
actions.2 In these cases, the Court employed a high level of 
scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of state action. 
Surprisingly, some case law suggests that participation in 
high school athletics deserves a special level of constitutional 
protection similar to that of the Brown and Goss cases. In 197 4, 
the Indiana Supreme Court decided Sturrup v. Mahan,3 and 
announced that the Indiana High School Athletic Association 
(IHSAA) bylaws affecting student eligibility may be subjected 
to mid-tier judicial scrutiny under equal protection analysis. 
This decision set a far-reaching precedent by which many other 
high school students have challenged IHSAA eligibility rul-
ings.4 Although it is laudable that the Indiana courts have set 
aside seemingly unfair applications of IHSAA eligibility rules, 
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
3. Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974). 
4. See Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 813 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D. 
Ind. 1993); Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 329 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
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their decisions have created more confusion than clarity. The 
cause of this confusion may be traced back to the Sturrup de-
cision itself. Recently Sturrup's shortcomings have again been 
highlighted as Indiana courts have been called upon to apply 
this precedent to different permutations of eligibility cases. 
Part II of this casenote examines the Sturrup decision. 
Part III addresses the threshold question of whether the 
IHSAA engages in state action and is governed by the Equal 
Protection Clause. Part IV criticizes the court's analysis in 
Sturrup for not explaining the constitutional basis for its spe-
cial treatment of IHSAA rules, failing to define the actual level 
of scrutiny it was applying, and incorrectly invoking federal 
constitutional authority. Part V illustrates the problems associ-
ated with using Sturrup as legal precedent by examining two 
recent Indiana Appellate Court cases. Finally, Part VI con-
cludes that Sturrup is too enigmatic to be of value as legal 
precedent, and that the Indiana Supreme Court should either 
satisfactorily explain its decision, or overturn it. 
II. Sturrup v. Mahan 
A. Facts of the Case 
In the summer of 1971, Warren Sturrup moved from the 
home of his mother in Miami, Florida, to live with his older 
brother in Bloomington, Indiana. 5 His change of residence was 
prompted by the "demoralizing and detrimental conditions" 
that existed in his home and school environments.6 At trial it 
was established that there was widespread use of narcotics 
among Sturrup's peers at Miami Palmetto High School, and 
specifically among his friends on the basketball team. 7 Further-
more, Sturrup lived in a two-bedroom home with his parents 
and ten sisters; consequently he could not study at home.8 
Finally, Sturrup's mother had a heart condition which prevent-
ed her from giving him the discipline or the attention he need-
ed.9 
Mter Sturrup's change of residence, his brother, Lamount, 
was appointed legal guardian by the Monroe Circuit Court. 10 
5. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 878. 
6. ld. 
7. ld. at 878, n.l. 
8. ld. 
9. ld. 
10. ld. at 881. 
223] HOOPS: A HOOSIER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT? 225 
Once enrolled at University Junior-Senior High School, howev-
er, Sturrup was declared ineligible to play basketball by his 
principal, Robert Mahan. Mter consultation with Commissioner 
Eskew of the Indiana High School Athletic Association, Mahan 
interpreted IHSAA Rule 12, Section 1 as disqualifying Sturrup 
from any inter-school sports for the entire school year. 11 The 
rule reads: 
No student, who has been enrolled as a high school student in 
any member school, shall be permitted to participate in any 
inter-school contest as a member of another member school 
until he has been enrolled in such school for one calendar 
year, unless the parents of such student actually change their 
residence to the second school district. In the latter case, the 
student will be as eligible as he was in the school from which 
he withdrew. 12 
Although out-of-state transferees are not specifically addressed 
by Rule 12, it has been interpreted broadly and applied to them 
as well. 13 
B. Procedural History and Lower Court Decisions 
At the trial court level, Sturrup attempted to enjoin Mahan 
and the IHSAA from declaring him ineligible for participation 
in varsity sports. 14 However, this preliminary injunction was 
denied. 15 Sturrup then appealed, winning a reversal of the trial 
court's decision. 16 The court of appeals held that the "IHSAA 
bylaws unconstitutionally burdened Warren Sturrup's funda-
mental right to travel among the states."17 Therefore, the 
court of appeals found that Sturrup was denied equal protec-
tion of the laws guaranteed under the 14th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 18 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals rea-
soned that the IHSAA constituted a state actor within the 
meaning of the 14th Amendment. 19 Mter finding state action, 
11. !d. 
12. !d. at 878-79. 
13. !d. at 878, n.2. 
14. !d. at 879. 
15. !d. 
16. !d. 
17. !d. 
18. !d.; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
19. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 879. See also Haas v. South Bend Community 
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the court had to determine whether the rule in question was 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment. Generally, when making this determination, a 
court will subject legislative classifications to rational basis 
scrutiny. Under this analysis, if a law bears a rational relation 
to the stated legislative goal, a court must uphold it-despite 
its under or over-inclusive effect.20 
Under strict scrutiny analysis, when a law involves suspect 
classifications or infringes on a fundamental right, the courts 
will hold it unconstitutional unless the law is necessary and 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.21 The 
court of appeals held that Rule 12 impeded Sturrup's funda-
mental right to travel among the states.22 Since Mahan and 
the IHSAA failed to establish that Rule 12 was necessary to 
the furtherance of a compelling state interest, the court of 
appeals reasoned that the bylaws denied Sturrup equal protec-
tion of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.23 
C. Indiana Supreme Court Decision 
When Mahan and the IHSAA appealed, the Indiana Su-
preme Court granted transfer of the case in order to "correct a 
fundamental error in the Court of Appeals' opinion."24 Justice 
Hunter, writing for the court, noted that while the Indiana 
Supreme Court reached the same practical outcome as the 
court of appeals, it did not agree with the lower court's applica-
tion of equal protection analysis.25 The court of appeals had 
based its ruling on the United States Supreme Court's holdings 
School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972); Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. 
Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Kriss v. Brown, 390 N.E.2d 193 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1979); Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 329 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1975). 
20. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). 
21. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (race is a factor in allocating pub-
lic benefits and burdens the law is suspect and subject to the most exacting scruti-
ny); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (interference with the fundamental 
right to marry cannot be upheld unless closely tailored to effectuate a sufficiently 
important state interest). 
22. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 879. 
23. Id. 
24. ld. 
25. ld. 
1 
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in Shapiro v. Thompson26 and Dunn v. Blumstein.27 These 
cases involved statutes which imposed durational residency re-
quirements for receiving welfare assistance and voting rights. 
The Court struck down both statutes on the grounds that they 
interfered with the fundamental right of interstate travel. 
Justice Hunter, however, distinguished Shapiro and Dunn 
from the present case since, in those decisions, the statutes in 
question applied only to individuals who moved from out of 
state.28 Thus, people moving from out of state and those 
changing residence within the state, although similarly situat-
ed, were treated differently under the law. In Sturrup, howev-
er, Rule 12 treated similarly situated people equally, regardless 
of whether they move from within or without the state, and 
therefore, the rule does not infringe upon the right of interstate 
travel.29 For this reason, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected 
the reasoning of the appellate court. 
Mter finding the appellate court's reasoning was flawed, 
the majority of the Indiana Supreme Court went on to affirm 
the judgment on different Equal Protection grounds. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Hunter began by discussing Rule 12's 
"constitutional infirmity."30 On their face, IHSAA bylaws ap-
pear to be well tailored to achieving desirable ends. The objec-
tive of IHSAA bylaws, and Rule 12 in particular, is to prevent 
the "despicable and odious" practices of "recruitment, proselyt-
ing, and school 'jumping' for athletic reasons."31 Justice Hunt-
er wrote: "Said bylaws are unreasonable in that they sweep too 
broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment."32 
Justice Hunter criticized Rule 12 for creating an over-inclu-
sive class with its irrebuttable conclusion that all transfer stu-
dents that do not fall within one of two narrow exceptions are 
participating in unfair recruiting practices.33 For example, a 
student transferring from a public school to a parochial school 
for purely religious reasons would be barred from varsity sports 
even though this outcome would in no way further IHSAA 
26. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
27. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
28. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 880. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 881. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (emphasis added). 
33. Id. 
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objectives. Looking at the ultimate purpose of IHSAA bylaws, 
the court determined that there was no basis for declaring 
Sturrup ineligible.34 
III. DOES THE IHSAA ENGAGE IN STATE ACTION? 
Mter reading Sturrup, one might wonder why the Indiana 
Supreme Court did not pose the threshold question of whether 
IHSAA eligibility rulings can be considered state action for 
purposes of Equal Protection analysis. This question is signifi-
cant because if the IHSAA is found to engage in state action, 
its bylaws and enforcement mechanisms are subject to plenary 
judicial review.35 If it is not considered a state actor, then the 
IHSAA is largely insulated from review under the principle of 
judicial deference to the policies ofvoluntary associations. 36 
The state action question seems especially important given 
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in NCAA v. 
Tarkanian37 and the central role that issue played in deter-
mining the standard of judicial review and, ultimately, the 
judgment. Although Sturrup was decided nearly two decades 
before Tarkanian, it seems strange that the Indiana Court 
entirely failed to address this issue, because the Indiana Su-
preme Court resolved the issue just two years prior to Sturrup, 
in Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp.38 , and Haas 
is perfectly reconcilable with Tarkanian. 
In Haas a female high school student challenged an IHSAA 
rule that kept her from competing on her school's only golf 
team, a men's varsity sport.39 The court reviewed IHSAA Rule 
9, section 7 that prohibited males and females from competing 
either on the same team or against teams composed of mem-
bers of the opposite sex.40 In striking down the rule on Equal 
Protection grounds, the court first concluded that the IHSAA 
engaged in state action.41 
34. ld. 
35. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ind. 
App. Ct. 1992). 
36. State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court, 117 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. 1954); United 
States Auto Club v. Woodward, 460 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
37. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
38. Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972). 
39. ld. at 496. 
40. ld. 
41. ld. at 497. 
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Regardless of how the IHSAA denominates itself as an orga-
nization, or how it characterizes its relationship with its 
member schools, it is abundantly clear that the association's 
very existence is entirely dependent upon the absolute cooper-
ation and support of the public school systems of the State of 
Indiana. The enforcement of the rules promulgated by the 
IHSAA and adopted by the member schools may have a sub-
stantial impact upon the rights of students enrolled in these 
tax supported institutions, and we conclude, therefore, that 
the administration of interscholastic athletics by the IHSAA 
should be considered to be "state action" within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 
Although the Haas decision was a departure from previous 
decisions which held that the IHSAA could not be considered a 
state actor,43 it has been upheld in all subsequent Indiana 
cases in which IHSAA rules were challenged as violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause.44 
In Tarkanian the United States Supreme Court found that 
the NCAA had not engaged in state action when compelling the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas to enforce NCAA prescribed 
sanctions against Coach Tarkanian.45 Since Haas, one federal 
district court in Indiana has drawn an analogy from the NCAA 
to the IHSAA to find that the IHSAA does not engage in state 
action.46 Although the decision of a federal district court sit-
ting in Indiana is not binding precedent for the Indiana Su-
preme Court,47 it may be indicative of another shift in state ac-
tor analysis. 
A thorough reading of Tarkanian reveals that organiza-
tions such as the IHSAA were not implicated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision. The Court distinguished Tarkanian 
from high school cases by pointing out that the NCAA is com-
42. Id. at 498. See also Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Saint Augustine 
High Sch., 396 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1968). 
43. State ex rel. IHSAA v. Lawrence Circuit Court, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959). 
44. Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1972); Thomas v. Greencastle 
Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Indiana High Sch. 
Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Kriss v. Brown, 390 
N.E.2d 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 329 
N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). 
45. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988). 
46. Anderson v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 699 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Ind. 
1988). 
47. Security Credit Acceptance Corp. v. State, 247 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1969). 
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posed of universities throughout the United States, the majori-
ty of which are not located in any one state.48 It held that the 
source of the NCAA's legislation is not the law of any one state, 
but "the collective membership, speaking through an organiza-
tion that is independent of any particular State."49 
In a footnote to the above quoted passage, the Court stat-
ed: "The situation would, of course, be different if the member-
ship consisted entirely of institutions located within the same 
State, many of them public institutions created by the same 
sovereign.50 In an Arizona case cited by the Supreme Court, 
the 9th Circuit court held that the Arizona Interscholastic 
Association was a state actor because "the activities of the 
[Arizona high school athletic association] are so intertwined 
with the state that the regulations of the [association] must be 
considered state action."51 Therefore, given the distinguishing 
characteristics between the NCAA and the IHSAA and the 
Supreme Court's footnote 13 from Tarkanian, there is no rea-
son to believe that Haas would be rejected by the Supreme 
Court. Likewise, there is no indication that the IHSAA should 
not be found a state actor. 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Sturrup opinion may be criticized on several levels. 
First, the Indiana Supreme Court did not explain why it de-
parted from traditional rational basis analysis. Second, and 
closely related to the first point, the court failed to define the 
level of review that it actually employed or the legal theory 
justifying the use of this undefined level of scrutiny. Third, the 
court based its opinion on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, rather 
than on similar guarantees within the Indiana State Constitu-
tion. 52 Fourth, the decision failed to create a coherent rule 
upon which later actions could be judged. 
48. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193. 
49. !d. 
50. Id. at 193, n.13; See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
51. Clark, 695 F.2d at 1128. 
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; IND. CONST., art. 1, § 23; Sturrup, 305 
N.E.2d at 879. 
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A. Rational Basis Scrutiny 
One of the most confusing aspects of Sturrup was the 
court's failure to utilize traditional rational basis scrutiny. In 
his decision, Justice Hunter described Rule 12 as intended to 
eliminate the "odious" practices of recruitment and school 
jumping for athletic purposes. He wrote: "These transferee eli-
gibility bylaws are reasonably related to the above-stated objec-
tive. That is to say, they are designed to and do, in fact, con-
tribute to the realization of that goal."53 If the court were uti-
lizing traditional rational basis review, such a finding would be 
sufficient to uphold the rule. 54 Since the Indiana Supreme 
Court reversed the lower courts' denial of eligibility, it is clear 
that Hunter did not apply the rational basis standard. 
B. What Level of Review was Applied? 
The facts of the case indicate that Rule 12 should not have 
been subjected to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is invoked only 
when a law restricts a fundamental right, or burdens a suspect 
classification.55 Justice Hunter did not contend that eligibility 
for high school athletics was a fundamental right, nor did he 
suggest that transfer students comprised a suspect class. Fur-
thermore, the court did not announce that the standard it em-
ployed was the same as that applicable to strict scrutiny anal-
ysis. 
Under strict scrutiny, a state action will be held invalid 
unless the state can prove that it is necessary and narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling state interest.56 Justice 
Hunter did not discuss whether discouraging school jumping 
and recruiting for athletic purposes is necessary to further a 
compelling state interest. Nor did he consider whether Rule 12 
is the least discriminatory means by which to achieve this 
objective. Absent all of these considerations, it is difficult to 
imagine that the court intended to apply strict scrutiny to the 
lHSAA bylaw, or that if it did, it was justified in doing so. 
Also markedly absent is any discussion of elements which 
would justify an intermediate level of scrutiny. A limited num-
ber of equal protection issues have been afforded mid-tier scru-
53. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 881. 
54. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
55. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
56. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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tiny. These include discrimination on the basis of quasi-suspect 
classification, such as gender, illegitimacy and alien status.57 
A law will fail intermediate scrutiny unless it is substantially 
related to an important governmental interest.58 Nevertheless, 
Sturrup involved none of the issues traditionally associated 
with mid-tier review. 
In several recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has 
applied a modified intermediate scrutiny to cases that involve 
different, arguably suspect classes, such as age classifications, 
mental illness and mental retardation.59 Although transferee 
student athletes have not been recognized by the Supreme 
Court as deserving special protection in earlier cases, they 
conceivably could be afforded mid-tier review as a newly recog-
nized suspect class. This idea is problematic in that the class 
implicated in Sturrup differs significantly from those recog-
nized by the U.S. Supreme Court because transfer student 
status is not an immutable characteristic and has rarely, if 
ever, been the basis of discrimination. Furthermore, Justice 
Hunter did not use any of the language which suggests the use 
of modified intermediate level scrutiny. He made no finding of 
whether Rule 12 was "substantially related to an important 
governmental interest." Additionally, he did not clearly identify 
an intention to recognize a new suspect classification. There-
fore, one is led to believe that a modified intermediate standard 
was not invoked either. 
C. Overbreadth 
The decision in Sturrup was based on an "overbreadth" 
analysis of Rule 12. The critical portion of the decision was ex-
tremely brief, consisting of only one paragraph, but directed 
exclusively at the issue of overbreadth. Justice Hunter stated 
that IHSAA transferee eligibility rules were designed to further 
a valid objective: "to preserve the integrity of interscholastic 
athletics by minimizing recruitment, proselyting, and school 
'jumping,' for athletic reasons."60 Justice Hunter wrote: 
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
58. ld. 
59. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Williams v. Ver-
mont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). 
60. ld. at 881. 
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These transferee eligibility bylaws are reasonably related to 
the above-stated objective. That is to say, they are designed to 
and do, in fact, contribute to the realization of that goal. How-
ever, said bylaws are unreasonable in that they sweep too 
broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment .... This is precise-
ly where the rules sweep too broadly, they create an over-
inclusive class-those who move from one school to another 
for reasons wholly unrelated to athletics are grouped together 
with those who have been recruited or who have "jumped" for 
athletic reasons. 61 
Thus, after originally holding that the IHSAA bylaws were 
"reasonably related" to a valid state objective, Justice Hunter 
concluded that "denying eligibility to such transferees in no 
way furthers IHSAA objectives."62 
The decision is the first impression that the rules satisfy 
the rational basis test. This is because they contribute to the 
realization of a valid state objective: minimizing unfair re-
cruitment practices. Nonetheless, Justice Hunter holds that the 
rule is so broad that it does not further its objective because it 
unfairly discriminates against innocent students; students who 
may transfer between schools for "academic or religious reasons 
or for any number of other legitimate reasons."63 Justice 
Hunter applied a standard similar to strict scrutiny analysis 
and found that IHSAA bylaws were not narrowly tailored to 
accomplish their objective. 
The decision did not identify or name the standard applied, 
nor did it cite authority to support his use of a quasi-strict 
scrutiny overbreadth standard. As explained earlier, strict scru-
tiny is invoked only when a law restricts a fundamental right 
or burdens a suspect classification.64 There are two ways to 
explain Justice Hunter's use of a quasi-strict scrutiny analysis. 
Either he intended to recognize a constitutional right to play 
high school basketball in Indiana, or he intended to use a new 
standard, which has been called "rational basis with teeth." 
61. ld. 
62. ld. 
63. ld. 
64. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
---------------------'"'"----,-------------..--
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D. Rational Basis with Teeth 
Victor Rosenblum, a Northwestern University Law School 
professor, has labelled the brand of review similar to that 
found in Sturrup "rational basis with teeth."65 He wrote: 
''We've gotten used to the idea that if the test is rational basis, 
the legislation gets an automatic pass. Now rational basis is 
beginning to mean something."66 Another commentator has 
suggested that courts are beginning to use this type of analysis 
to "reach perceived injustices that otherwise lie beyond consti-
tutional reach."67 
Unfortunately, application of rational basis with teeth is 
neither consistent nor predictable. In fact, on the rare occasions 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court has used this mode of analy-
sis, it has not labeled it as such or explained its reasoning.68 
Commentators have severely criticized this approach to consti-
tutional law as creating too much leeway for courts to closely 
scrutinize legislation whenever it so desires. Courts are also 
criticized for creating confusion as to what standard of review 
is actually being used. As illustrated by the case at hand, the 
rational basis with teeth level of analysis is usually not identi-
fied within the text of the decision itself.Rational basis with 
teeth could also be labeled intermediate review in disguise. It 
is the functional equivalent of the "substantially related to an 
important state interest" test69 without an accompanying ex-
planation of what triggered it. Finally, given the absence of an 
identifiable triggering classification or interest, confusion will 
invariably arise over what version of the rational basis test to 
apply in any given case. 70 These criticisms are clearly illus-
trated by Indiana High School Athletic Association v. 
Schafer71 and Thomas v. Greencastle Community School 
Corp. 72 
65. Quoted in Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108, 
112-114 (1985). 
66. ld. 
67. ld. at 112. 
68. Gayle L. Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny 
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 801 (1987). 
69. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
70. Pettinga, supra note 68, at 780. 
71. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
72. Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
1 
r 
I 
l 
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E. Equal Protection Under Federal and State Constitutions 
It is clear from reading Sturrup that Justice Hunter based 
his opinion on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. As stated earlier, such 
a basis for the decision was unprecedented. The U.S. Supreme 
Court cases in which rational basis with teeth has been applied 
involved legislation which burdened important rights of groups 
at least approaching quasi-suspect status.73 For example, in 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court struck down a 
statute requiring a special use permit for a proposed group 
home for the mentally retarded, finding that it was not ratio-
nally related to any permissible government purpose. 74 The 
Court did not, however, consider whether there was any con-
ceivable government interest in requiring a permit. Clearly 
there were interests besides discrimination on the basis of 
mental retardation, such as zoning requirements, public safety 
or the safety of the center's residents themselves. 
Apparently the Court found that the mentally retarded as 
a class approached quasi-suspect classification and therefore 
deserved extra protection. The group and the burdens involved 
in Sturrup, however, do not approach a level of significance 
equal to those in Cleburne. Accordingly, they do not deserve 
enhanced rational basis scrutiny under the United States Con-
stitution. Under traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis, 
the Sturrup decision appears wrong. 
The unavailability of greater than rational basis review 
under the Federal Equal Protection guarantee does not 
eliminate the possibility of relief. An understanding of Con-
stitutional history indicates that federal law was never envi-
sioned as the ultimate protector of civil liberties. In fact, for a 
century and a half after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, state 
constitutions remained the principal force in American civil 
liberties. 7s What Justice Hunter incorrectly attempted to justi-
fy under the Federal Constitution could legitimately have been 
accomplished through application of the Indiana State Consti-
tution, Article I, Section 23, which states, ''The General Assem-
73. Pettinga, supra note 68, at 801; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); 
74. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432. 
75. Chief Justice Randall T. Shephard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of 
Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575, 576 (1989). 
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bly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges 
or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally 
belong to all citizens."76 
Indiana case law is replete with examples of protections 
provided by the Indiana Constitution not supported by the 
Federal Constitution. As early as 1820, in State v. Laselle, the 
Indiana Supreme Court held that "our constitution intended a 
total and entire prohibition of slavery in this State.'177 More 
than 100 years before Gideon v. Wainwright18 was decided by 
the United States Supreme Court, the Indiana Supreme Court 
held that a criminal defendant who could not afford an attor-
ney had the right to representation at public expense. 79 To 
this day, the Indiana Supreme Court is willing and anxious to 
announce and protect rights which emanate from the state 
constitution. 
In his speech, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 
Randall Shepard, Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, 
laments that in appellate proceedings attorneys base their 
arguments solely on the United States Constitution.80 
The rights of Americans cannot be secure if they are protected 
only by courts or only by one court. Civil liberties protected 
only by a U.S. Supreme Court are only as secure as the War-
ren Court or the Rehnquist Court wishes to make them. The 
protection of Americans against tyranny requires that state 
supreme courts and state constitutions be strong centers of 
authority on the rights of the people. I am determined that 
the Indiana Constitution and the Indiana Supreme Court be 
strong protectors of those rights.81 
Shepard also suggested that in cases without remedy under the 
Federal Constitution, failure to argue a claim based on the 
state constitution may preclude otherwise appropriate relief on 
those grounds. In Sturrup there is no clear indication of why 
the court would choose to apply enhanced rational basis scru-
76. IND. CONST., art. I, § 23. See infra text accompanying note 95 for a dis-
cussion of an appellate court decision suggesting that Sturrup may have been prop-
erly decided based on the Indiana State Constitution. 
77. State v. Lasselle, 1 Blackf. 60, 62 (Ind. 1820) as cited in Shephard, supra 
note 75, at 577. 
78. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
79. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854), as cited in Shepard, supra note 75, 
at 578. 
80. Shepard, supra note 75, at 584. 
81. ld. at 586. 
. j 
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tiny, or what precedent within Indiana state law would support 
such an analysis. But there is ample precedent to support the 
finding of protections under the Indiana State Constitution not 
available under the Federal Constitution. 
V. Sturrup AS LEGAL PRECEDENT 
Despite the lack of clarity in Sturrup itself, that decision 
has been relied on extensively in cases involving the IHSAA. 
Two appellate court cases illustrate problems faced by Indiana 
courts when applying Sturrup, and what the Indiana Supreme 
Court might do to clarify the constitutional questions surround-
ing eligibility for high school athletics. 
A. Indiana High School Athletic Association v. Schafer82 
1. Facts of the case 
During the 1990-91 school year, Shane Schafer was a ju-
nior at Andrean High School in Merrillville, Indiana.83 
Schafer attended school during the entire fall semester. Early 
in the spring semester, Schafer was forced to withdraw from 
school due to a very serious sinus infection which had plagued 
him throughout the school year.84 Because of the cumulative 
nature of his courses, Schafer would be forced to repeat his fall 
semester courses in order to be prepared for the subsequent 
spring classes.85 In June of 1991, Schafer wrote to the IHSAA 
and requested that his 1990-91 school term not be counted 
against his eligibility for varsity basketball.86 Schafer's re-
quest was denied, based on several provisions of the IHSAA 
bylaws. 
Most significant was Rule 18-1 on Scholarship.87 Rule 18-
1 states: "To be eligible scholastically, students must have re-
ceived passing grades at the end of their last grading period in 
school in at least five full credit subjects or the equivalent and 
must be currently enrolled in at least five full credit subjects or 
the equivalent. Semester grades take precedence.88 Subpart 
82. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
83. ld. at 542. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. ld. 
87. Id. at 543. 
88. ld. 
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18-1.5 interprets the rule: "[a] subject for which credit has 
previously been granted may not, if repeated, be counted to 
satisfy this rule."89 Rule 18-1 was designed to prevent athletes 
from retaking classes which they had already mastered in 
order to gain more practice time. 
2. Procedural history 
The IHSAA ruled Schafer ineligible because he would not 
be enrolled in five full credit subjects during the Fall semester, 
as he planned to repeat classes for which credit had already 
been given. 90 Schafer challenged his ineligibility ruling in dis-
trict court.91 Schafer won his prayer for declaratory relief at 
the trial level, after which the IHSAA appealed. 92 As in 
Sturrup, the standard of review employed by the court was a 
major issue and proved to be largely determinative of the out-
come. 
3. Court of appeals 
The court of appeals stated that Rule 18 rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest. But the court held that their 
equal protection analysis had not "run its course," because the 
decision in Sturrup mandates further inquiry.93 Judge 
Barteau, writing for the court, stated that Sturrup required an 
"overbreadth" analysis on top of traditional rational basis scru-
tiny, despite the fact that "federal decisions hold that under 
traditional equal protection scrutiny a rule may not be invali-
dated due to overbreadth."94 To the extent that the rule in 
question does not raise problems of "suspect classifications," 
the weight of precedent from other jurisdictions suggests that 
overbreadth scrutiny is inappropriate.95 
89. !d. 
90. !d. 
91. !d. at 545. 
92. !d. at 546. 
93. !d. at 552. 
94. !d. at 552-53. See also Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 449 
U.S. 1124 (1981); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
95. See Berschback v. Grosse Point Pub. Sch. Dist., 397 N.W.2d 234, 240 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Cooper v. Oregon Sch. Activities Ass'n, 629 P.2d 386, 395 
(Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
1 
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Despite a recognition that Sturrup is "out of the main-
stream of case law on equal protection analysis"96 and while 
hinting its disapproval of overbreadth scrutiny in this class of 
cases, the court held that it was necessary to follow the Indiana 
Supreme Court. Barteau wrote: ''This obligation binds us even 
where our supreme court has explained neither the rationale 
nor the 'constitutional implications' of its decisions."97 
The court went on to suggest a possible rationale for the 
Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Sturrup. "[l]t is conceiv-
able that our Supreme Court could decide that a Sturrup-like 
overbreadth analysis in equal protection cases is proper under 
our Indiana Constitution, even if such analysis is not available 
under the U.S. Constitution."98 As noted earlier, this possible 
rationale is supported by a long line of Indiana cases, but not 
suggested in Sturrup itself. 
4. Problems with the application of Sturrup 
As illustrated by Judge Barteau, Sturrup suffers from all 
of the deficiencies associated with rational basis with teeth 
analysis generally. Sturrup created confusion as to what stan-
dard of review should be applied in athletic eligibility cases. 
The Sturrup court's failure to identify the factors which justify 
using heightened scrutiny makes the decision seem arbitrary, 
and akin to the judicial interventionism associated with the 
Lochner era. 99 During the Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied a highly subjective substantive due process anal-
ysis to the objectives, means and effects of legislation. In 
Schafer, it appears that Judge Barteau did not understand the 
rationale for employing an overbreadth analysis. He could not 
identify any special classification or interest involved that 
would trigger a level of review less deferential than rational 
basis scrutiny. Yet rational basis with teeth resembles interme-
diate scrutiny without an accompanying justification for its 
96. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 553. 
97. ld.; See also Patton v. State, 507 N.E.2d 875, 878-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
98. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 554, n.9. 
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (law limiting maximum hours 
for bakery employees violates 14th Amendment); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 
(1915) (state law requiring employees to agree not to join a labor union invalidated 
under 14th Amendment); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (mini-
mum wage law invalidated under 14th Amendment); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 
270 U.S. 402 (1926) (state law banning all use of shoddy fabrics for bedding invali-
dated under 14th Amendment). 
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application of the "substantially related to an important state 
interest" standard. By employing overbreadth analysis, Judge 
Barteau, in effect, used the same standard as that used in 
many intermediate scrutiny cases. This, of course, would not be 
a problem if all high school athletics cases looked exactly like 
Sturrup. Yet, as illustrated in Schafer and, more clearly, in 
Thomas v. Greencastle Community School Corp., 100 Sturrup 
did not create a rule which could be applied with any consisten-
cy or predictability. 
B. Thomas v. Greencastle Community School Corp. 101 
1. Facts of the case 
During his junior year, Shane Thomas was an outstanding 
running back for the Greencastle High School football 
team. 102 As a result of a learning disability, Thomas had re-
peated the second grade. 103 Therefore, Thomas turned 19 
years of age during the summer before his senior year. 104 Ac-
cording to IHSAA Rule 4, any student turning 19 before August 
15 could not participate in varsity athletics. 105 Thomas chal-
lenged his ineligibility on a theory that the class was under-
inclusive and violated his right to equal protection of the 
law. 106 For example, while Thomas was being excluded from 
varsity football due to advanced age, the rule would still allow 
a student born on August 16 to compete in varsity baseball6 to 
8 months after his 19th birthday. 107 
2. Procedural history 
Thomas anticipated that the IHSAA would declare him 
ineligible for varsity athletics during his senior year. 108 
Therefore, Thomas proposed a rule change that would allow 
him to play football the following year. 109 The IHSAA rejected 
100. Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
101. !d. 
102. !d. at 191. 
103. !d. at 191-92. 
104. !d. at 191. 
105. !d. 
106. !d. at 193-94. 
107. !d. at 194. 
108. !d. at 192. 
109. !d. 
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his proposal. 110 Thomas responded by filing a complaint for 
injunctive and declaratory relief in which he sought to bar 
enforcement against him of IHSAA Rule 4. 111 The IHSAA was 
granted summary judgment at the trial level. The trial court 
concluded that Rule 4 was rationally related to the objectives of 
promoting the health and safety of participants in varsity 
sports. 112 
3. Court of appeals 
Thomas based his appeal on Sturrup and Schafer, contend-
ing that IHSAA rules were properly reviewed using a rational 
basis with teeth analysis. 113 He argued that under-inclusive-
ness should be just as offensive and actionable as the over-
inclusive rules struck down earlier. 114 But Judge Sharpnack, 
writing the opinion of the court, interpreted Sturrup and 
Schafer narrowly. He wrote: "We read. . . Sturrup to require 
the application of a modified rational basis test whereby we 
first examine whether the rule is rationally related to a legiti-
mate goal, and, if so, whether it sweeps too broadly ."115 Since 
the IHSAA rules implicated in Schafer were very similar to 
those involved in Sturrup, the Schafer court was constrained to 
follow the Sturrup methodology. But, concerning binding pre-
cedent for Thomas, Sharpnack wrote: 
However, because the Sturrup court gave no reason for its 
departure from traditional equal protection analysis and did 
not provide any guidance as to its future implications, we 
read Sturrup and Schafer narrowly. Where we are presented 
with a rule similar to the ones involved in those cases, we will 
examine them for rationality and broad over-inclusiveness, 
but no more.116 
Thus, the court of appeals employed traditional rational basis 
scrutiny to Rule 4, finding that it bears a rational relationship 
to a legitimate state interest. 117 The court further held that a 
110. I d. 
111. Id. at 191-92. 
112. Id. at 192. 
113. I d. 
114. ld. at 193-94. 
115. ld. at 193. 
116. I d. 
117. Id. at 194. 
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classification may be substantially under-inclusive and still 
rationally relate to its stated objective. 118 
4. Problems with the application of Sturrup 
Like Schafer, this application of Sturrup also suffers from 
all of the deficiencies associated with rational basis with teeth 
analysis. Since the Sturrup court did not identify a quasi-sus-
pect classification, or even the factors which justify using 
heightened scrutiny, the Thomas court did not feel constrained 
to employ a modified rational basis scrutiny analysis. Since 
Thomas dealt with an under-inclusive classification, rather 
than a Sturrup-like over-inclusive one, the court of appeals had 
no guidance as to whether enhanced rational basis scrutiny 
should apply. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sturrup has led to much confusion in Indiana's lower 
courts. Although it may be argued that Thomas and Schafer 
are distinguishable, the mysterious underlying constitutional 
principles of Sturrup cannot be cited as authority for such a 
distinction. A fundamental problem with Sturrup and its proge-
ny is that either no one knows the constitutional philosophy 
behind modified rational basis scrutiny of certain IHSAA rules, 
or no one has expressed it. It would appear that either the 
Sturrup court's decision was constitutionally unjustifiable and 
arbitrary or simply short-sighted and poorly drafted. As lower 
courts are forced to follow Indiana Supreme Court precedent, 
Sturrup will continue to be of only limited value because its 
enigmatic drafting only allows it to be applied to cases very 
similar to Sturrup itself. 
With Sturrup the Indiana Supreme Court may have recog-
nized a new class of people deserving of special judicial protec-
tion. Although not provided for by the Federal Constitution, 
such protection might be derived from the Indiana Constitu-
tion. On the other hand, Sturrup may have been a prime exam-
ple of sloppy, ends-oriented judicial rulemaking at its worst. 
What the courts of Indiana, and concerned observers elsewhere, 
deserve and expect is clarification of the issue from the court 
promulgating the ruling. The Indiana Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari to consider another case dealing with IHSAA 
118. ld. 
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bylaws and either satisfactorily explain its Sturrup decision, or 
overturn it. In the meantime, however, the lower courts in 
Indiana should follow the age-old practice of narrowly inter-
preting an unpopular, unclear or poorly reasoned rule. As 
Thomas and Schafer illustrate, the rule will not clarify itself 
merely through the passage of time. 
Christopher D. Keeler 
